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11 12	Attorneys for Defendants Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers and Göran N	
13	IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF ARIZONA COUNTY OF PINAL	
14 15	George Kelly and George Kelly as slingfantasy.com, slingfantasy.net, securesite10.com, and slingframes.com,	Case No. S-1100-CV-201700918
16 17	Plaintiff,	
18	V.	DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS AND MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
19	ICANN (Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers) Göran Marby its president, and CEO And John Doe's 1-15,	MOTION TO DISMISS
20	Defendants.	Oral Argument Requested
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24 25		
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MOTION

Defendants, by and through counsel, hereby move to dismiss this action for lack of
personal jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted under
Arizona law. This motion is supported by the following memorandum of points and authorities,
the Declarations of Göran Marby and Akram Atallah, and the entire record in this matter.

6

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

7 I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff George Kelly ("Plaintiff") improperly seeks to have this Court exercise personal 8 jurisdiction over defendants Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 9 ("ICANN"), a California non-profit public benefit corporation, and its President and Chief 10 Executive Officer, Göran Marby, a Swedish citizen who lives and works in Los Angeles 11 County, California pursuant to an O-1 nonimmigrant visa. Neither ICANN nor Mr. Marby, 12 however, have any meaningful contacts with Arizona that would render either of them subject to 13 suit in Arizona. Specifically, they do not maintain offices, facilities or any other presence in 14 Arizona, they do not have assets in Arizona, and they do not solicit business in Arizona. Indeed, 15 the evidence submitted by ICANN and Mr. Marby in connection with this motion establishes 16 that neither defendant has sufficient contacts with Arizona that would warrant their being haled 17 18 into court in this State. In addition, Plaintiff's Complaint and Summons ("Complaint"), which alleges "malfeasance," "nonfeasance," and "aiding and abetting," fails to identify any 19 cognizable causes of action or factual bases for those claims, and therefore fails to state a claim 20 for which relief can be granted under Arizona law. For both of these separate and independent 21 reasons, Plaintiff's entire Complaint should be dismissed with prejudice. 22

23 II. BACKGROUND

24

A. ICANN.

ICANN is a California non-profit public benefit corporation with its principle place of
 business and headquarters in California. (Declaration of Akram Atallah ("Akram Decl.") ¶ 2 .)

ICANN does not engage in commercial business, but rather oversees the technical coordination
 of the Internet's domain name system ("DNS") on behalf of the Internet community. (*Id.*, ¶ 3.)
 One essential function of the DNS is to convert numeric IP addresses into easily-remembered
 domain names such as "azcourts.gov" and "ICANN.org." (*Id.*)¹

5 ICANN fulfills its DNS coordination role in a number of ways. For example, ICANN 6 accredits the companies that act as "Registrars," which are the companies that assist consumers 7 and businesses in obtaining the right to use individual, second-level domain names, such as such 8 as ebay.com or NPR.org. (*Id.*, ¶ 4.) But beyond monitoring Registrars' compliance with 9 ICANN policies regarding the registration of second-level domain names, ICANN is not 10 involved in the actual registration or de-registration of, or disputes regarding, individual domain 11 names. (*Id.*, ¶ 4.)

ICANN has no office in Arizona. (*Id.*, \P 6.) It does not employ individuals to work in Arizona, does sell anything in Arizona, and does not hold any licenses in Arizona. (*Id.*, $\P\P$ 6-9.) ICANN does not have any phone listings or mailing addresses in Arizona, does not have any bank accounts in Arizona, and does not own any real property in Arizona. (*Id.*, $\P\P$ 9, 12.) Likewise, ICANN does not directly pay any taxes in Arizona. (*Id.*, \P 10.)

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B. Göran Marby.

Mr. Marby is ICANN's President and Chief Executive Officer. (Declaration of Göran
Marby ("Marby Decl.") ¶ 1.) Mr. Marby is a Swedish citizen who resides in Los Angeles
County, California, where he works at ICANN's office pursuant to an O-1 nonimmigrant visa.
(*Id.*, ¶ 2.) Like ICANN, Mr. Marby has no office in Arizona, does not employ individuals to

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¹ ICANN operates a few passive websites on the Internet that provide information regarding its Internet coordination activities, as well as publicly available information about domain name registrants, including the websites at http://www.icann.org, http://www.iana.org, and http://www.internic.net. (Atallah Decl., ¶ 5.) The websites contain a wealth of information about ICANN, about the people who work for ICANN and about the projects that ICANN has undertaken in connection with the Internet. (Id.) ICANN

about ICANN, about the people who work for ICANN and about the projects that ICANN has undertaken in connection with the Internet. (*Id.*) ICANN, however, does not offer anything for sale on its websites; in fact, ICANN does not sell anything. (*Id.*)

work in Arizona, does not sell anything in Arizona, does not hold any licenses or registrations to
 do business in Arizona, does not have any phone listings, mailing addresses, or bank accounts in
 Arizona, does not own any real property in Arizona, and does not directly pay any taxes in
 Arizona. (*Id.*, ¶ 3-10.)

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C. Plaintiff's Claims.

Plaintiff's Complaint alleges that ICANN and/or Mr. Marby committed "malfeasance"
and "nonfeasance," as well as "aiding and abetting," seemingly in connection with the loss of
several second-level domain names that Plaintiff alleges to have operated at one time.²
(Complaint at 1:20-2:55.)

Plaintiff first alleges that ICANN and/or Mr. Marby committed malfeasance by "electing
to adopt an ill-conceived policy without proper oversight to insure [sic] such policy was not
abused, then allowing another affiliated entity's [sic] or person to abuse or misunderstand the
nature of that policy, and or any other policy, and then abusing the policy for un-intended use by
the contractor, or by it, ICANN, to conduct some sort of an un-natural act[.]" (*Id.*, 1:20-27.)
The Complaint, however, does not identify what policy is allegedly at issue, or how such policy
purportedly harmed Plaintiff.

Plaintiff next alleges that ICANN and/or Mr. Marby aided and abetted "in the
commission of an illegal crime, or some other negative event." (*Id.*, 1:30-38.) The Complaint
does not name who ICANN aided or abetted, how such aiding and abetting took place, or what
crime or "negative event" occurred. Lastly, Plaintiff claims that ICANN and/or Mr. Marby
committed nonfeasance by "fail[ing] to act when it could," (*Id.*, 40:1-2), but the Complaint does
not identify what ICANN and Mr. Marby should have done, when they should have acted, why
they should have acted or how failing to act caused harm to Plaintiff.

²⁴² Although both ICANN and Mr. Marby are named as defendants in the Complaint, the 25 allegations within the complaint itself are made against "the corporation," presumably referring to ICANN, or "defendant" in the singular. It is therefore not clear from the Complaint which of 26 Plaintiff's allegations, if any, are against Mr. Marby.

Plaintiff seeks \$49,990 in damages, as well as costs. (*Id.*, 3:100.) Plaintiff also requests
that ICANN and/or Mr. Marby be "directed to help and aid in any way in regaining plaintiff's
legal property, and then to cause, to re-instate all of plaintiff's domains...and then by it, and
cause somehow that the domains shall remain registered in that manner for life or at least twenty
five (25) years," and "revisit its policies to correct any errors that may have been made." (*Id.*,
103-110.) Yet Plaintiff does not identify a single domain name purportedly at issue, nor a single
policy that he asserted may need to be corrected.

⁸ III. ARGUMENT

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A. Plaintiff's Claim Must Be Dismissed Because This Court Lacks Personal Jurisdiction Over ICANN and Mr. Marby.

Plaintiff's Complaint fails to invoke any basis for the Court's jurisdiction over ICANN or
Mr. Marby, which itself is cause for dismissal. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 8 ("A pleading that states a
claim for relief must contain...a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's
jurisdiction[.]"). Even if that omission was not fatal to the case (which it is), neither ICANN nor
Mr. Marby has the necessary "minimum contacts" with Arizona for this Court – or any court in
Arizona – to assert personal jurisdiction over them.

Under Arizona's long-arm statute, Rule 4.2(a), Arizona courts may exercise personal 17 18 jurisdiction to the maximum extent allowed by the United States Constitution. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 4.2(a); Planning Grp. of Scottsdale, LLC v. Lake Mathews Mineral Props., Ltd., 226 Ariz. 262, 19 266 (2011); Hoag v. French, 238 Ariz. 118, 122 (2015), as amended (Sept. 2, 2015), review 20 denied (Feb. 9, 2016). The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment limits the 21 exercise of personal jurisdiction by state courts over non-resident defendants. *Planning Group* 22 of Scottsdale, LLC, 226 Ariz. at 266. "A state court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a 23 [non-resident defendant] only if that defendant has 'sufficient contacts' with the forum state 24 'such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and 25 substantial justice." Id., quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 26

Personal jurisdiction is divided into two types: general jurisdiction and specific 1 jurisdiction. Williams v. Lakeview Co., 199 Ariz. 1, 3 (2000); Hoag, 238 Ariz. at 122. Under 2 either specific or general jurisdiction, "the constitutional touchstone remains whether the 3 defendant purposefully established 'minimum contacts' in the forum State." Williams, 199 4 Ariz. at 3. The "minimum contacts" test also applies to natural persons. *Planning Grp. of* 5 Scottsdale, L.L.C., 226 Ariz. at 266. Plaintiff has the burden of establishing the existence of 6 personal jurisdiction, which he has failed to, and cannot, carry. Macpherson v. Taglione, 158 7 Ariz. 309, 311-12 (1988). 8

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1. There is no general jurisdiction over ICANN or Mr. Marby in Arizona.

A non-resident defendant is subject to general jurisdiction "when the defendant's contacts with the forum state are substantial or continuous and systematic enough that the defendant may be haled into court in the forum, even for claims unrelated to the defendant's contacts with the forum." *Williams*, 199 Ariz. at 3 (stating that "[t]he level of contact required to show general jurisdiction is quite high."). Here, ICANN and Mr. Marby do not have sufficient contacts with Arizona to support general jurisdiction.

Neither ICANN nor Mr. Marby has offices or employs any individual in Arizona, nor is
licensed or registered to do business in Arizona. (Atallah Decl. ¶¶ 6-8; Marby Decl. ¶¶ 3-5.)
Neither has a registered agent for service of process in Arizona, pays direct taxes in Arizona, or
has a phone number or mailing address in Arizona. (Atallah Decl. ¶¶ 9-11; Marby Decl. ¶¶ 68.) Neither holds any bank accounts nor owns any real property in Arizona. (Atallah Decl. ¶¶
12, 13; Marby Decl. ¶¶ 9, 10.) In fact, Plaintiff has not presented any evidence that either
ICANN or Mr. Marby has any contacts with Arizona, much less continuous and systematic
contacts that are sufficient to impose general personal jurisdiction over them.

24

2.

There is no specific jurisdiction over ICANN or Mr. Marby in Arizona.

25 When a defendant's activities in the forum state are not so pervasive as to subject it to 26 general jurisdiction, the court may still find specific jurisdiction if: (1) the defendant

purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting business in the forum; (2) the claim
 arises out of or relates to the defendant's contact with the forum; and (3) the exercise of
 jurisdiction is reasonable. *Williams* 199 Ariz. at 3; *Batton v. Tennessee Farmers Mut. Ins. Co.*,
 153 Ariz. 268, 271, (1987) ("When specific jurisdiction is at issue, the minimum-contacts
 inquiry focuses on the relationship between the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.").
 Here, Plaintiff has not established (because he cannot) a single element of the test for specific

ICANN and Mr. Marby cannot be deemed to have "purposefully availed [themselves] of 8 the privilege of conducting business" in Arizona, because neither have conducted business in 9 Arizona, nor have any meaningful contacts in or with Arizona at all. (Atallah Decl. ¶ 5-13; 10 Marby Decl. ¶¶ 3-10.) Nor is there any allegation in the Complaint even suggesting that the 11 basis of Plaintiff's allegations arise from activities conducted by ICANN or Mr. Marby within 12 Arizona. To the extent Plaintiff even mentions "actions" ICANN or Mr. Marby allegedly took 13 to cause him harm, he references the enactment of (unnamed) policies. Because ICANN's 14 headquarters and other offices are outside of Arizona and Mr. Marby works and resides outside 15 of Arizona, any activity relating to ICANN's enactment of a policy would not have occurred in 16 Arizona. Moreover, ICANN is not involved in the registration or de-registration of, or disputes 17 18 regarding, individual domain names (Atallah Decl. ¶ 4), which appears to be the basis of Plaintiff's claims. Given this, Plaintiff certainly cannot establish that the exercise of specific 19 jurisdiction over either ICANN or Mr. Marby in this case would be reasonable. 20

At bottom, Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts suggesting that jurisdiction over either ICANN or Mr. Marby is proper in Arizona. Moreover, the evidence provided by ICANN and Mr. Marby with this motion demonstrates that sufficient Arizona contacts do not exist and that personal jurisdiction over either defendant in Arizona is inconsistent with "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." *Hoag*, 238 Ariz. at 122. The fact that Plaintiff alleges that he resides in Arizona, and so presumably allegedly suffered harm in Arizona, is insufficient.

Cohen v. Barnhard Vogler & Co., 199 Ariz. 16, 19 (App. 2000) ("When the only nexus with the 1 forum state is the effect of a damage-causing event, the requisite minimum contacts [that are 2 required, under the Due Process Clause, for personal jurisdiction,] generally do not exist."). 3 Plaintiff's Complaint against ICANN and Mr. Marby must therefore be dismissed for lack of 4 personal jurisdiction.³ 5

6

В.

Plaintiff's Claim Must Be Dismissed For Failure To State A Claim.

Arizona courts assess the sufficiency of a claim under Rule 8 of Arizona's Rules of Civil 7 Procedure, which requires that a pleading contain a "short and plain statement of the claim" 8 showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Ariz. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Cullen v. Auto-Owners 9

Ins. Co., 218 Ariz. 417, 419 (2008), citing Mackey v. Spangler, 81 Ariz. 113, 115 (1956). 10

Arizona follows a notice pleading standard, the purpose of which is to give a defendant "fair 11

notice of the nature and basis of the claim and indicate generally the type of litigation involved." 12

Id. If a pleading does not comply with Rule 8, an opposing party may move to dismiss the 13

action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Id.; Ariz. R. Civ. P. 14

12(b)(6). 15

When adjudicating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, Arizona courts look only to the 16 pleading itself and consider the well-pled factual allegations contained therein. Id.; Dressler v. 17 Morrison, 212 Ariz. 279, 281 (2006); Long v. Ariz. Portland Cement Co., 89 Ariz. 366, 367-68 18

³ Similarly, ICANN and Mr. Marby are not subject to personal jurisdiction in Arizona by maintaining passive Internet websites that do little more than make information available to 20 citizens of Arizona, along with the rest of the world. (Atallah Decl., $\P 5$). See Pebble Beach Co. v. Caddy, 453 F.3d 1151, 1158 (9th Cir. 2006) (an internet domain name and passive website 21

alone are not enough to subject a party to jurisdiction); ThermoLife Int'l, LLC v. DNP Int'l, Co., 22

No. CV-12-02105-PHX-NVW, 2013 WL 12202657, at *2 (D. Ariz. Mar. 6, 2013) (passive websites, "on which a defendant simply posts information that is accessible to users broadly, 23 including users in the forum state... do not generally justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction

when a defendant does not have other forum contacts."); BBK Tobacco & Foods LLP v. Juicy eJuice, No. CV-13-00070-PHX-GMS, 2014 WL 1686842, at *7 (D. Ariz. Apr. 29, 2014) ("... 24

a passive website cannot support personal jurisdiction."). See also Economic Sols., Inc. v. 25 Internet Corp. for Assigned Names & Numbers, No. 4:00CV1785-DJS, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

^{25449,} at *7 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 22, 2001) (ruling that ICANN's website "does not constitute 26 purposeful contact with Missouri or any particular location.").

(1961). Because Arizona courts evaluate only a complaint's well-pled facts, mere conclusory
 statements are insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. *Cullen*, 218 Ariz at
 419. While inclusion of conclusory statements might not automatically invalidate a complaint,
 if a complaint states only legal conclusions without any supporting factual allegations, it cannot
 satisfy Arizona's notice pleading standard under Rule 8. *Id*.

No claim in Plaintiff's Complaint survives under Arizona pleading standards. Putting 6 aside whether Plaintiff's claims for malfeasance and nonfeasance are viable stand alone civil 7 causes of action, Plaintiff fails to provide any factual basis for the assertion of those claims. 8 Plaintiff vaguely references the enactment of policies without stating what those policies are, 9 what they do, or how they may have harmed Plaintiff. Plaintiff notes that he has lost "certain 10 domains" but fails to identify the domains, or state how or when he lost them – or how the loss 11 was connected to any specific action by either ICANN or Mr. Marby. He accuses one or both of 12 them of aiding and abetting a crime or "negative event," without stating what that crime or event 13 was, or – again – how the crime or event harmed Plaintiff. 14

Plaintiff's Complaint is utterly devoid of any information that would give ICANN and
Mr. Marby "fair notice of the nature and basis of the claim and indicate generally the type of
litigation involved." Plaintiff has thus failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
under Rule 12(b)(6), and his Complaint should be dismissed with prejudice. *McHenry v. Renne*,
84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (affirming dismissal with prejudice of amended complaint
that did not comply with Rule 8).

21 IV. CONCLUSION

As explained above, the Complaint should be dismissed for two separate and independent reasons – lack of personal jurisdiction over either ICANN or Mr. Marby, and failure to state a claim against either defendant. ICANN and Mr. Marby therefore respectfully request that the Court dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint in its entirety and with prejudice.

1	DATED this 19th day of July 2017.
2	DESSAULES LAW GROUP
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4	By: <u>/s/ Jonathan A. Dessaules</u> Jonathan A. Dessaules
5	F. Robert Connelly
6	Attorneys for Defendants Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers and Göran
7	Marby
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1	ORIGINAL filed and COPY of the foregoing Mailed/e-mailed this 19th day of July, 2017 to:
2 3	George Kelly
4	Contact Information Redacted
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6	Plaintiff Pro Per
7	/s/ Victoria Saint Amour
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